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ON HIS MAJESTY’S SECRET SERVICE:
ACCOUNTING FOR THE SECRET
SERVICE IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
PERIL 1782-1806
Abstract: Reforms to the civil list in the late 18th century in England
sought to deny the Crown opportunities to use its civil-list funds and
sinecures to buy influence in Parliament and, thereby, diminish constitutional protections for liberty. Among the most important reforms
were tighter accounting requirements for civil-list spending, including that for the secret services. The unique nature and purpose of the
home and foreign secret services, which were the responsibility of
the Crown and paid from civil-service funds, resulted in accounting
controls which depended upon additional measures to provide Parliament with greater control over spending and enhanced accountability.
These enhancements to accountability were especially important at
a time of almost continual war between England and France in the
decades spanning the close of the 18th century, resulting in significant
increases in spending on the foreign secret service.

INTRODUCTION
The history of English public-sector accounting from the
“Glorious Revolution” in 1688 has been dominated by the need
to ensure the financial authority of Parliament. In the late 18th
century, during a remarkable period of public-sector reform,
the constitutional intent of making the executive financially
accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of monies appropriated by Parliament was confirmed as the essential, undiminished reason for the unprecedented reforms to government
accounting associated with the civil list. Binney [1958, p. v]
has referred to the last two decades of the late 18th century as
a period of “unique interest and importance” in the history of
British public finance for this period “witnessed the first drawing back of the curtain concealing from parliamentary and
public view the design and action of the financial machine.”
The American War of Independence (1776-1783) and the almost
continuous war with France from 1792 until 1815 were particuPublished by eGrove, 2010
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larly important in prompting reform of civil-list accounting and
audit reforms which provided the basis for subsequent enduring
reforms in the 19th century.
Until the financial crisis created by the American War of
Independence, Parliament took little interest in the civil administration of the “King’s Executive,” most notably accounts of
expenditure from the civil list, which provided for the financial
needs of the monarch, both personal and those of his executive
government [Chester, 1981, p. 34]. Unlike the civil list, parliamentary control over military spending through a stricter accounting and appropriation regime had been among the most
important constitutional outcomes of the Glorious Revolution.
The War of Independence exposed for the first time since then
the extent to which the Crown used the civil list as a potent form
of patronage and, thereby, allowed the Crown to threaten liberty
by extending its influence in the House of Commons.
In a recent paper, Funnell [2008] has examined the process
by which widespread apprehension caused by the increasing arrogance of the Crown confirmed the belief at the end of the 18th
century that there was an intimate dependency between a rigorous, parliamentary-controlled accounting for executive spending
on the civil list and the preservation of liberties fundamental to
the English Constitution. Although Funnell’s study provides a
detailed rendition of the motives for the civil-list reforms and
the accounting consequences of the reforms for most forms of
civil-list spending, absent is any mention of the secret services,
the peculiar purpose of which might have been expected to have
very different accountability requirements. The main aim of
the present paper is to meet this omission by highlighting the
changes to accounting for secret-service funding during the time
that William Pitt1 was prime minister (1783-1801, 1804-1806)
which were coincident with the comprehensive reform of the
civil list that began in the early 1780s and with later ongoing
hostilities with France. In particular, this paper is concerned
with a curious, yet understandable, paradox at the time in
Parliament’s position on accounting for secret-service monies
when compared with the improved accounting for other civil-list
spending, resulting in a less rigorous regime of formal accounting controls and a greater reliance on professions of honesty.
1
In this paper, “William Pitt” signifies the British prime minister often referred to as William Pitt the Younger to distinguish him from his father, William
Pitt the Elder, also a prominent politician in the 18th century, later known by his
title as the Earl of Chatham when elevated to the peerage.
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The overriding need to shield from overt public scrutiny those
who protected the nation’s interests by engaging in clandestine
activities, sometimes at the risk of their lives, meant that Parliament was prepared to treat the secret services as a special case,
which might permit a very different set of accountability controls and acceptable behaviors. However apposite Parliament’s
position may have been at the time, rarely has this been without
its critics. Namier [1963, p. 176], for one, referred to how:
Legends naturally surround all ‘secret service’; its very
name inspires fear and distrust and stimulates men’s
imagination – it is believed to be wise and wicked, efficient and powerful. In reality the most common characteristic of political secret service at all times is its stupidity and the unconscionable waste of money which it
entails. Where its task is to obtain ‘intelligence,’ it most
frequently produces tales which could not stand five
minutes’ cross-examination in a law court.
The present article, which deals with an exceptional period
in the history of public-sector accounting and accountability
at the end of the 18th century, is the first in the accounting history literature to examine the tensions between the peculiar and
required mode of operation of secret services and the need to
ensure accountability and transparency for the monies required
of these services. The growing body of public-sector accounting
history has been overwhelmingly concerned with accounting
methods used in central government and audit, notably in times
of war [for example, see Funnell, 1994; Black, 2001; Edwards et
al., 2002]. The great freedom allowed the Crown in the spending
of secret-service funds from the civil list and the absence of an
effective means to ensure that spending on the domestic and
foreign secret services would be controlled in total and accounted for systematically was a major concern of the promoters of
the reform of the civil list in the late 18th century. Any spending
by the Crown allowed to go unchecked represented a potential
threat to liberty, none more than spending on secret services.
Indeed, a prominent part of the Civil Establishments Act 1782
[22 Geo. III, c. 822], the centerpiece of the achievements of the
economic reform movement championed by Edmund Burke
2
“An act for enabling his Majesty to discharge the debt contracted upon his
civil list revenues; and for preventing the same from being in arrear for the future,
by regulating the mode of payments out of the said revenues, and by suppressing or regulating certain offices herein mentioned, which are now paid out of the
revenues of the civil list.”
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and the basis of subsequent government accounting reforms
[see Funnell, 2008], was devoted to innovations that limited total
spending for some parts of secret-service spending and tightened
the means by which those directly spending the funds would be
made accountable. Particularly notable as a form of accounting
control was the statutory reliance upon the swearing of oaths.
In the absence of accounts supported by documentary evidence,
these oaths fulfilled a highly effective, supplementary role in
the accounting process. While oaths were certainly not a new
feature of government, or indeed of the administration of law,
Parliament’s reliance upon them in the context of accounting for
secret-service spending recognized especially both the necessary
imperfections of the secret-service accounts and the religious
imperative in accountability relationships at the time.
In the first section that follows, a brief outline is provided of
the evolution of modern secret diplomacy and the importance
of the English secret service in the late 18th century, a time of
considerable international instability and threat for England.
The civil-list reforms in the late 18th century are then examined
to identify the very different approach that was implemented
for reforming the control of, and accounting for, secret-service
spending. Most of the details of secret-service spending in the
18th century that survive, and upon which this research relies,
are to be found preserved at the British National Archive, Kew,
in Home Office (H.O.) accounts, Foreign Office (F.O.) accounts,
Treasury (T) documents, and those from the Audit Office (A.O.).
THE ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION OF
THE ENGLISH SECRET SERVICE
The English secret service in the late 18th century was the
product of a long period of evolution that owed much to the
practices of other countries, in particular Italy. From the Italian
city states during the Renaissance arose the features of intelligence gathering that were to define the modern intelligence
services throughout Europe. Although the need for information
about one’s enemies or potential enemies had always been important in any military success as far back as ancient times, not
until the 14th and 15th centuries did this intelligence gathering
reach a sophisticated and truly effective form in the Italian city
states of Venice and Genoa, a form that was quickly mimicked
by most other major European states [Thompson and Padover,
1963]. The Venetians had realized that the best way to create
and maintain the means to gather reliable information was to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/3
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establish permanent embassies in neighboring states [Thompson and Padover, 1963, p. 17]. Not until the 16th century did
England under Henry VIII (1509-1547) follow the Italian example and establish permanent embassies in the major European
states [Bleiweis, 1976, pp. 2-3].
Most historians trace the origins of the modern English
secret service to the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and her
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Francis Walsingham
(1534-1590). In 1573, Walsingham was appointed to the powerful Privy Council and in this capacity, notes Haynes [1994, p.
25], contributed “mightily” to the foreign affairs of England.
Walsingham took office in the late 16th century at a time when
the major European states were seeking to expand their influence and territory and, therefore, were prone to conflict. The
17th century inherited this instability and became a century of
almost continual wars, commercial and political.
In response to the considerable international pressures
during Elizabeth’s reign, Walsingham created, for the times,
a formidable intelligence network, with intelligence gathered
mainly from sources in Holland, France, and Germany. Plowden
[1991, p. 55] believes that so sophisticated and comprehensive
was Walsingham’s intelligence-gathering network that it is “no
exaggeration to say that very little went on in Catholic circles …
during the 1570s and 1580s” that did not come to Walsingham’s
notice. Ambassadors were for Walsingham the most important
official source of information, providing reports of court gossip,
major political events, and official meetings [Bleiweis, 1976, p.
39]. Unofficial sources were the largest, most diverse but least
reliable group of “intelligencers,” which included English living abroad, soldiers, sailors, businessmen, artists, and students
[Bleiweis, 1976, pp. 16-18; Haynes, 1994, p. 12]. One 17th century contemporary [quoted in Thompson and Padover, 1963,
p. 60] wrote that diplomats should nurture their spies because
“Well-chosen spies contribute more than any other agency to the
success of great plans … And there is no expense better designed
… than that which is laid out upon a secret service, it would be
inexcusable for a minister of state to neglect it.”
Despite the historical importance of intelligence gathering
for state security, not until 1582 did Elizabeth’s “spy master”
Walsingham have a regular budget. Initially it was set at £750,
rising to £2,000 in 1588. Still, this was never sufficient for Wal
singham to meet the need for regular, reliable foreign intelligence
from mainly Catholic France. Despite his frequent supplications
for more money, he often had to use his own money to keep his
Published by eGrove, 2010
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intelligence operations functioning, eventually bankrupting him
and his family [Plowden, 1991, p. 55; Haynes, 1994, p. 12].
Intelligence gathering was later raised to even more sophisticated levels under John Thurloe who became Secretary
of State in 1652 during the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell.
Thurloe was convinced that the best agents were those who
were motivated by money and that the essential requirement of
an effective intelligence service was “a good purse” [Thompson
and Padover, 1963, p. 92]. As a dictatorship surrounded by numerous domestic and foreign enemies, often working together,
an efficient intelligence-gathering system was essential to the
maintenance of Cromwell’s authority. Thus, Cromwell spent on
average more than £70,000 a year to garner both domestic and
foreign intelligence, none of which he formally accounted for. So
effective were his secret services that Samuel Pepys concluded
that “Cromwell carried the secrets of all the princes of Europe
at his girdle” [quoted in Thompson and Padover, 1963, p. 83].
Although England was almost continually in a state of preparation for war in the century that followed the dictatorship and the
restoration of the monarchy, not until the wars with France did
England under William Pitt the Younger again fully appreciate
the benefits of an effective secret service.
As effective and comprehensive as Cromwell’s secret services were, the spending on them while Pitt was prime minister
represented a very different scale of operation and sophistication. From almost the outbreak of revolution in France in 1789
until the end of hostilities in 1815, England was either at war
with France or believed that it needed to be ready for war. In
addition, when Pitt became prime minister, England had only
recently lost the American colonies, its hold over India was
being threatened by widespread administrative abuses, and
rebellion had been growing in Ireland. When war with France
did break out in April 1792, Britain quickly established an extensive, well-funded espionage center in neutral Switzerland to
coordinate the collection of intelligence under the direction of
William Wickham. France, Pitt warned England, had directed its
hostilities “against the very essence of your liberty, against the
foundation of your independence … against your constitution
itself” [House of Commons, November 10, 1797, in Pitt, 1806, p.
172]. So successful was intelligence gathering in the time of Pitt,
that it is sometimes credited with a critical role in expanding
and consolidating the British Empire [Thompson and Padover,
1963, p. 158]. Table 1 below shows that between 1785 and 1792,
spending on all parts of the secret service increased signifihttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/3
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cantly when England joined with her European allies against the
French. Annual outlays for the secret service in these years averaged £24,000 [Mitchell, 1965, p. 256]. There was a particularly
significant rise in foreign-service spending after 1794 as war
began to envelop Europe.
TABLE 1
Charges Incurred and Paid for Secret Service Money,
1775-1798

Year

Sums issued to
the Secretaries
of State (mainly
for foreign-secret
service)
£

£

£

£

1775

11,250

34,000

7,249

52,499

1776

9,000

39,000

6,263

54,263

1777

9,000

57,000

7,139

73,139

1778

9,000

51,000

7,159

67,159

1779

7,250

62,000

7,239

76,489

1780

8,362

37,000

7,139

52,501

1781

6,750

40,000

7,875

54,625

1782

15,225

31,000

3,569

49,794

1783

35,500

8,000

0

43,500

1784

7,006

3,000

0

10,006

1785

31,878

6,000

0

37,878

1786

25,727

96,000

0

121,727

1787

98,050

10,000

0

108,050

1788

212,851

10,000

0

222,851

1789

32,154

10,000

0

42,154

1790

26,221

10,000

0

36,221

1791

22,244

10,000

0

32,244

1792

14,992

10,000

0

24,992

1793

39,585

10,000

0

49,585

1794

49,335

10,000

0

59,335

1795

173,068

10,000

0

183,068

1796

183,194

10,000

0

193,194

1797

223,222

10,000

0

233,222

1798

175,000

10,000

0

185,000

Sums issued to
Treasury (mainly
for home-secret
service)

Sums issued to
Post Office (for
home-secret
service)

Total

Source: “An Account of the Charges Incurred and Paid for Secret Service Money,
1774-1798,” House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Vol.
121, July 4, 1799.
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Apart from the continued reliance upon traditional sources
of information, the Post Office in the 18th century, as Table 1
demonstrates, was an especially effective means of collecting
information about domestic and foreign matters until the 1780s,
when the funding arrangements for secret services changed dramatically. The importance of the Post Office as a source of intelligence, both domestic and foreign, was established in 1710 with
the passage of An Act for establishing a General Post Office for all
her Majesty’s Dominions [12 Anne c. 10]. The act gave the Post
Office a monopoly over all movement of mail. There was to be
only “one General Letter Office and Post Office … erected within
the City of London, from whence all Letters and Packets … may
be sent into any Part of the Kingdom … or to North America,
the West Indies, or to any other of her Majesty’s Dominions …”
[12 Anne c. 10, Section II]; control was to be absolute. These
exclusive rights gave the Post Office the ability to monitor almost all the mail entering, leaving, and moving around England.
The act also allowed the Principal Secretaries of State, and only
them, to delay and open any mail [12 Anne c. 10, Section XL].
Irrespective of the source of information, Namier [1963, p. 176]
regarded all secret-service spending in the early modern period
as a waste of money. With the primary function of the secret service to buy corruption, it was to be expected that it would only
be successful in purchasing the services of individuals whose
services were unlikely to be worthwhile. Secret-service spending
created a “mutual benefit society for pseudo-political parasites”
with a financial interest in fomenting fear and exaggeration
[Namier, 1963, p. 176].
The unique nature of the secret service and its growing importance, cost, and sophistication in the 18th century were recognized when it came time in the closing decades to reform the
civil list and accounting for civil-list expenditures, with several
main sections of the Civil Establishments Act concerned exclusively with the secret services.
REFORM OF THE CIVIL LIST AND THE SECRET SERVICES
Throughout the 18th century, the relationship between
Parliament and the executive was one of an overdeveloped desire to ensure a separation of their respective powers. Only by
“destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the
legislature and the rest” would the constitution be threatened
[Bentham, 1776, p. 73]. Parliament did not want to know how
the King spent his money from the civil list on the royal househttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/3

8

nnell: On His Majesty's Secret Service: Accounting for the Secret Service in a time of national peril 1782-18
Funnell, His Majesty’s Secret Service

37

hold or on the civil government; Parliament only wanted to be
certain that limits were placed on the level of civil-list spending
[Funnell, 2008]. It was the King’s government and it was accepted as the King’s constitutional right to govern as he saw fit
[Chubb, 1952, p. 9; Blackstone in Roseveare, 1969, p. 87]. The
civil-list funds were therefore accepted as a means of reducing
any constitutional friction between the Crown and Parliament
[Cromwell, 1968, p. 5]. The high ideals of the constitution, however, did not prevent the Crown from regularly attempting to
influence Parliament through the use of honors and sinecures
associated with the civil list, which Castlereagh observed were
“more likely than any others to secure parliamentary influence”
[quoted in Foord, 1947, p. 499].
The cost of the royal household and of departments of state
was to be met primarily from the Crown’s hereditary sources of
income. In addition, Parliament granted monarchs additional
funding at the beginning of their reigns, which constituted the
civil-list funds. The intention of Parliament was to ensure that
the Crown had sufficient income to meet all its needs, both the
personal needs of the sovereign and for carrying out executive
functions. In return, the Crown was expected to live within its
income, except during periods of emergency such as wars. The
reality was somewhat different. Even in the absence of war,
Parliament was frequently called upon to vote amounts to cover
large accumulated deficits in the royal budget. However, it was
war, and the Crown’s indebtedness that war inevitably produced,
which provided Parliament with unchallengeable opportunities
to examine the financial affairs of the Crown when additional
funding from Parliament was sought, none more so in the 18th
century than the American War of Independence [see Funnell,
2008].
The American War of Independence was a watershed in not
only refashioning England’s standing as an imperial power but
also in the changes that it produced in government finances. The
mounting cost of the war and the Crown’s growing indebtedness
and influence in Parliament soon raised concerns about the way
in which the war was being managed, about whether the money
taken from a small and wealthy elite was being used effectively
and appropriately. From this spreading discontent arose the
economical reform movement, popularized by Edmund Burke’s
speech in the House of Commons on February 11, 1780 [Parliamentary History, XXI, cols. 1-73]. Earlier Burke [Parliamentary
History XX, December 7, 1779, col. 1,257] had criticized spending on the war and for domestic purposes as:
Published by eGrove, 2010
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Lavish and wasteful to a shameful degree. Oeconomy,
the most rigid and exact oeconomy, has become absolutely necessary … Amidst the many and various matters that require reformation … before this country can
rise superior to its powerful enemies; the waste of public treasure requires instant remedy …
While financial concerns most immediately and directly
created the economical reform movement, these were also
symptomatic of a more fundamental and far more serious
worry. The vast sums involved in the war against the American
colonies allowed the Crown to purchase greater influence in
Parliament with the granting of profitable, war-related contracts
and sinecures [Watson, 1960, pp. 232, 247]. According to one
member of the House of Commons, in no other period of history
did contracting abuses “flourish in such rank extravagance. At
no other period were they so detrimental to the public service”
(observations made in the House of Commons, as quoted in
[Porritt, 1963, p. 218]). A leader of the economical reform movement, Christopher Wyvill, warned that the war had resulted in
“the national substance … fast waning away by the profusion
of expence in this rash and unfortunate war; and the influence
of the Crown fed by that very prodigality, and increased in full
proportion to it, is now swollen to a most alarming magnitude”
[quoted in Harling, 1996, p. 34].
Allowing the Crown to buy influence by the granting of
sinecures undermined the independence of both public officials
and weakened the constitution [see Burke in Cromwell, 1968,
p. 6]. The Crown’s influence during the War of Independence,
observed the pre-eminent constitutional authority William
Blackstone, had become “most amazingly extensive” [Blackstone quoted in Foord, 1947, p. 484; Funnell, 2008]. Charles Fox
referred to this influence of the Crown as the “one grand domestic evil, from which all our other evils, foreign and domestic,
have sprung. … To the influence of the Crown we must attribute
the loss of the … thirteen provinces of America …” [quoted in
Ayling, 1972, p. 287]. Dunning’s resolution in the Commons that
“the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and
ought to be diminished” [Parliamentary History XXI, April 6,
1780, cols. 340-388; Watson, 1960, p. 232; Ayling, 1972, p. 283]
helped to precipitate the beginning of the end of the more outrageous abuses of royal patronage. Deficiencies in accounting for
civil-list expenditures, including for the secret services, and the
threat that this posed to liberty also prompted Dunning [Parliamentary History XXI, April 6, 1780, col. 367, also col. 691; see
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/3
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also Foord, 1947, p. 491] to call upon the House:
To examine into and to correct abuses in the expenditure of the civil list revenue. … If the public money was
faithfully applied and frugally expended, that would reduce the influence of the Crown; if, on the other hand,
the influence of the Crown was restrained within its
natural and constitutional limits, it would at once more
restore that power which the constitution had rested in
that house – the inquiring into and controlling the expenditure of public money …
Enactment of the remarkably innovative Civil Establishments Act [22 Geo. III, c. 82] in 1782, which owed its existence
to the commitment, political standing, and brilliance of Edmund
Burke, provided for the elimination of many sinecures which
had been used to enhance the Crown’s influence in Parliament
[see Funnell, 2008]. It also established a more formal regime of
accounting for civil-list funds, thereby enhancing Parliament’s
financial authority over the executive. More immediately, it introduced a number of iconoclastic reforms to control the level of
spending on the secret services and to enhance significantly parliamentary surveillance through improved accounting requirements centered on the Treasury.
The highly influential Lord Shelburne believed at the time
that publicity through better accounting was the only sure way
to avoid the abuses that now plagued the executive and the civil
list. He sought to ensure that all matters that involved expenditure should be open to public view, although, significantly, not
those pertaining to the secret services [Binney, 1958, p. 268]. Accounting for the secret services had always been haphazard and
at the discretion of the Crown. When upon leaving the Treasury
in 1766, Lord Rockingham asked how to close the secret-service
accounts, he was informed by the Duke of Newcastle, one of
his predecessors, that when he had provided the secret-service
accounts to George II, “the late King used to burn them in the
presence of the person who was concerned” [quoted in Namier,
1963, p. 173]. Only rarely when the Crown sought additional
funds to meet mounting deficits would Parliament be able to
see something of what had been spent on the secret services and
how it had been spent. Accordingly, the secrecy that normally
surrounded the civil list was to be found in an exaggerated form
with the accounts for the secret services, which allowed the
Crown great discretion in the use of money for secret service or
other purposes, including corrupting Parliament. Use of secretservice funds to buy influence in Parliament had a long hisPublished by eGrove, 2010
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tory, especially at election time. In one election, cited by Namier
[1963, p. 203], the not inconsiderable sum of £1,000 was paid
out of the secret-services money of the civil list to the Duke of
Argyll and additional monies paid to another 24 candidates. In
addition, between elections, considerable sums were spent out
of the secret-service funds to assist the government in gaining
influence in boroughs.
ACCOUNTING FOR SECRET-SERVICE SPENDING
AND THE 1782 ACT
Spending Limits: The Civil Establishments Act has been described by Reitan [1966, p. 335] as the act that finally ended
the struggle over the nation’s finances between Parliament and
the executive. Pitt was later to remind Parliament that it should
never take for granted its financial authority for “the general
principle which constituted the chief security of our liberties
… [was still] the power of controlling the public expenditure”
[House of Commons, December 8, 1796, in Pitt, 1806]. The
overriding intentions of the act to give greater publicity to the
financial affairs of the executive and to control spending on the
civil list were clearly established in the preamble with the need
for “introducing a better Order and Oeconomy in the Civil List
Establishments, and for the better Security of the Liberty and
Independency of Parliament.”
Until Burke’s reforms, there was no protocol for determining the amounts to be spent on the secret services, which were
organized according to domestic or foreign activities. This
changed notably in the case of the home secret-service spending
when, in response to repeated abuses and the absence of reliable
accounts which permitted these abuses, Burke was able to introduce statutory limits to spending. The 1782 act required “for
preventing … all Abuses in the Disposal of Monies issued under
the Head of Secret Service Money” for monies spent “within
this Kingdom,” that the home secret service, was not to exceed
£10,000 in any one year [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXIV]. At the
same time, in an effort to tighten control over the issue of secretservice monies, the new act no longer allowed the Post Office to
be a conduit for these monies. This is clearly seen in Table 1
above where, after 1782, all secret-service funding for the Post
Office ceased. The Post Office would still remain a very effective
means of collecting intelligence throughout England and in obtaining intelligence by intercepting communications to and from
foreign representatives in England.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/3
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Burke made it clear that he did not want to threaten the
effectiveness of the home secret service but, consistent with the
main purpose of the act, he did want to limit the total spending in any one year and deny the Crown any discretion in the
amounts to be spent. Should the total spent on the home secret
service need to increase beyond the amount now set by legislation, this would now have to be considered by Parliament
since any increase in spending required an amendment to the
controlling legislation. Thus, the total spent on the home secret
service was to be limited, indeed fixed, and better controlled by
Parliament. Although it served an important role during periods
of major social unrest, of which the 1790s are notable, the home
secret service under Pitt, as before, never assumed any great
importance. Indeed, there are very few references to agents in
its employ in extant ministerial papers and other official documents from the late 18th century. Rarely did its agents work
full-time in gathering information [Ehrman, 1983, p. 137]. Accordingly, spending on the home secret service was insignificant
when compared to that which had for some time been spent on
the foreign secret service. Spending on the foreign secret service, often in states which were potentially and actively enemies
of England, was also far more difficult to control with certainty,
especially in times when war threatened to erupt at anytime.
Where it was not possible easily to limit the level of spending “by reason of the uncertain quantity of the service,” such
as in a time of war, Burke’s Act required that any spending for
the service be confined “to its line”; that is, all spending for the
service must be accounted for in the one type of appropriation
and not distributed between votes or types of appropriations
which would provide the Crown with the opportunity to hide
spending and to deceive Parliament. He sought to reassure
Parliament that he did not seek “to stop the progress of expense
in its line, but to confine it to that line in which it professes to
move” [Parliamentary History, February 14, 1780]. This had the
great advantage of allowing Parliament to be certain that, while
the level of spending may not be within its full control, the appropriation accounts would guarantee that it was aware of the
extent to which spending had occurred. For this to be effective,
a more prominent role for the Treasury was required.
The Accounting Role of the Treasury and the Secretary of State: To
enhance further the control of all secret-service spending and
accounting, from 1783 on, all secret-service monies would be
issued only through the Treasury, to whom the person receiving
Published by eGrove, 2010
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the monies would be accountable and from whom he would
receive his discharge. No longer would secret-service monies be
paid out of civil-service monies without the express permission
of the Commissioners of the Treasury [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section
XXVIII]. The Treasury was also required to keep detailed accounts of all parts of the civil-service receipts and spending and
to strike an annual balance for each element [22 Geo. III, c. 82,
Section XXXV]. At the head of the Treasury were the five Lords
Commissioners, with the First Lord specifically authorized to
pay monies out of the fund provided for secret services [Binney,
1958, p. 170]. In addition to now controlling all accounting and
audit for civil-service monies, the Treasury was the authorized
body to commence any legal actions for the recovery of any
amounts for which a discharge had not been given.
Complementing the greatly enhanced role of the Treasury
in accounting, the 1782 act stipulated that the authority to use
the money appropriated to the foreign secret service was now to
be restricted to only three senior public officials who, ultimately,
would be held accountable to Parliament through the Treasury
for the monies given into their charge. Accordingly, the 1782
act required that the payment of any monies from the civil-list
revenues for the foreign secret service was to be only through
one of the Principle3 Secretaries of State at the Foreign Office
and the Home Office or the First Commissioner of the Admiralty
[22 Geo. III. c. 82, Section XXV]. Thus, for example, the following information concerning use of civil-service funds for the
foreign service was still being sent to the Treasury decades later
in September 1830: “£432/13/- received by Earl of Aberdeen,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and spent on Foreign
Secret Service and for which I am accountable under Civil List
Act of 22 George III c. 82” [A.O. 119/118]. Each of the newly authorized officials would be charged by the Treasury with secretservice monies and required to submit accounts to the Treasury
at predetermined intervals to receive their discharge or quietus.
Consistent with the wider reform of accounting for civil-service
spending and, in particular, to provide greater transparency
and accountability for monies given to senior officials, the Civil
Establishments Act also prohibited the long-standing practice of
allowing secret-service monies paid to the Principle Secretaries
of State to be disguised as part of their salary. Thus, in 1769, for
example, £3,000 was paid to each of the two Principle Secretaries of State, the Secretary for Home Affairs and the Secretary
3

“Principle” is the correct historical spelling for the period.
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for Foreign Affairs, from secret-service monies as part of their
salaries [Namier, 1963, p. 192]. After the 1782 act, secret-service
monies would now be clearly identified as salary, a fee, or an allowance.
Most of the money provided through the Treasury to the
three senior approved officials subsequently would be made
available to English ambassadors and senior officers in the
armed services who, in turn, would be charged to account for
this money to one of the Secretaries of State or the First Commissioner of the Admiralty. Previous to the 1782 act, secretservice monies were given to a number of ministers who would
dispense the money to their informants or officials, mostly ambassadors, as they saw fit. For this money, they neither expected
nor required any receipts or other documentary evidence to
verify how the money was spent, only that it was received by the
ambassador and had been spent for the purposes authorized.
The greatly enhanced role for the Treasury in accounting for
secret-service monies required by the 1782 act also extended to
the audit of the accounts. Audit was put on a more permanent
and regular footing in 1785 with the creation of five Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts and their office, the
Board of Audit4 [25 Geo. III c. 52], which was placed very firmly
under Treasury control [see 25,Geo. III, c. 52, sections VIII, XI,
XIV, XVIII, XIX, XXI]. In particular, the Treasury continued to
be responsible for executing the commissioners’ oath of office
[s. IV], appointing audit staff, and for determining all conditions
associated with their employment [s. V]. The 1785 act marked
“in the strongest manner the intention of the legislature that
… [the Board] should be strictly subject to the controls of the
Treasury” [1810 Committee on Public Expenditure, Fifth Report,
p. 388]. In practice, the 1810 Committee on Public Expenditure
[Fifth Report, p. 398] found that this meant that:
the decision of the Auditors is in no instance final; but
the Lords of the Treasury exercise complete authority
with regard to all the articles of an Account … [The]
special jurisdiction of the Treasury is constantly and
habitually necessary to the final settlement and passing
4
The first Board of Audit, appointed on July 5, 1785, consisted of, in addition
to the five commissioners, two of whom were Controllers of Army Accounts, two
Inspectors General on £500 per.annum, and 16 clerks earning between £80 and
£300 per annum. By September 1785, an extra seven junior clerks, a solicitor,
an office keeper and two messengers had been appointed. The office was further
expanded in 1787 and remained at a total complement of 43 until into the 19th
century [Establishment Rolls, Board of Audit 1785-1799, National Audit Office].
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of the greater part of the Public Accounts which are examined by the Commissioners of Audit.
In another attempt to promote the wise management of individual civil-list revenues and to ensure that the necessary services would be provided without the Crown accumulating debts
which at regular intervals had required Parliament to grant additional funding, the 1782 act placed a limit of £900,000 on the
civil list. Very controversially, the act also provided for payments
to be made in a prescribed, unvarying order from the eight
classes specified for the appropriation of civil-list revenues. The
latter condition was intended in particular to reduce discretion
in how secret-service monies were spent. Where discretion by an
official of the Crown was able to be exercised over the civil-list
money appropriated by Parliament, Burke sought a new “plan of
arrangement” to prevent this discretion being abused. In Burke’s
view, it was not “safe to permit an entirely arbitrary discretion
even in the First Lord of the Treasury himself; it will not be safe
to leave with him a power of diverting the public money from
its proper objects, of paying it in an irregular course…” [Parliamentary History, February 14, 1780]. Removing the ability of
the Crown to choose how to spend secret-service monies would
enhance the ability of Parliament to make the executive accountable by establishing in the act “a fixed and invariable order in all
… payments, which it shall not be permitted to the First Lord
of the Treasury, upon any pretence whatsoever, to depart from”
[22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXIV]. Only when the costs of each
higher-ranked service had been fully provided for could the next
class of expenditures be paid.
Not surprisingly, the first priority of payments from the civil
list was the pensions and allowances of the royal family. This
was followed in the second class by payments for allowances
and pensions of senior government and parliamentary officials,
such as the Speaker of the House of Commons, and judges.
Payments to England’s ambassadors and foreign consuls, which
included secret service payments, formed the third class in the
civil list. Cleverly, to encourage Commissioners of the Treasury
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take seriously their
new responsibilities for the civil list, their salaries and other
remuneration were provided for in the eighth and final class [22
Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXI]. Thus, not until all other demands
on the civil list had been met, would these officials receive any
payments. In 1786, with a total of £900,000 now fixed for civilservice spending and when spending for the first seven classes
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/3
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of civil spending totaled £897,000, there was only £3,000 left
available for the Commissioners of the Treasury. Outcomes such
as this, notes Watson [1960, p. 248], made it very unlikely that
corruption and bribery by the Crown would be allowed to occur
on any appreciable scale and, at the same time, encouraged a
much more closely policed accounting regime. In addition, the
act prohibited any amounts unpaid to the Commissioners of the
Treasury being treated as arrears, providing another powerful
incentive to watch spending closely [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section
XXXII; Binney, 1958, p. 271]. Should any amount be unpaid, the
arrear “shall be wholly lapsed and extinguished, as if the same
had not been payable” [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXIII]. Accounts of spending in the order prescribed were to be kept by
the Treasury and made available to both Houses of Parliament
when required [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXV].
Oaths and Accounting for a Quietus: While clear lines of accountability for secret-service monies were established by the 1782
act, when it came to accounting for these after funds had left
the hands of the Secretaries of State and were given to agents
in the field, a very different set of accounting practices prevailed
to that required for all other parts of the civil list, thereby recognizing the peculiar nature of secret-service expenditure. The
juxtaposition of secrecy and access to large sums of money
with few formal accountability controls over agents in the field
of service recognized that accounting for secret-service spending on the frontline was expected to be very different from that
of other civil-list spending. Certainly it was unlikely, given the
nature of the process of gathering information from individuals
who would wish that their identities remain known only to their
immediate contacts, that there was the opportunity to obtain
detailed receipts for expenditures in a similar manner to that of
other government services. Burke recognized that the fluidity
and unpredictability of international politics, hence the need for
intelligence gathering and the need to keep secret the identities
of those gathering intelligence for England, meant that a very
different way of exercising accountability and of obtaining accounts was required.
Ambassadors, consuls, or commissioners representing England in another country, or any commander-in-chief or other
senior commander of the navy or land forces receiving secretservice monies from the Secretaries of State, would be expected
to provide receipts for the money received, although these were
in aggregate only. Unlike the more stringent accounting requirePublished by eGrove, 2010
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ments now required for all other civil-list monies, these receipts
were required to state only that the money had been received
for the “purpose for which the same hath been issued” [22 Geo.
III, c. 82, Section XXV]. The Secretaries of State and the First
Commissioner of the Admiralty would receive their discharge or
quietus from the Treasury once the necessary receipts had been
received and given to the Treasury. Crucially, they had to swear
an oath in person before the Barons of the Treasury, testifying
to the veracity of the accounts based upon these receipts. These
receipts from ambassadors and others had to be provided to
the Exchequer within three years of the money being issued
to obtain a quietus. The receipts for monies received from the
Secretaries of State and the First Commissioner of the Admiralty which formed the basis upon which a charge was created
against officials in foreign postings, were sufficient, once the
handwriting had been verified, to “acquit and discharge the
said Secretary or Secretaries, or First Commissioner of the Admiralty, in their said Account at the Exchequer” [22 Geo. III, c.
82, Section XXV]. The accounts for secret-service monies, with
receipts for spending, now required to be submitted by Secretaries of State to the Treasury, and thence to the Audit Office, were
in the form of the traditional charge-and-discharge accounts. In
Figure 1 below, the account and the oath which accompanies
it is typical of foreign secret-service accounts provided after
Burke’s Act in 1782 and after refinements contained in 45 Geo.
III, c. 76 in 1805.
Should it be necessary for the Secretaries of State or the
First Commissioner of the Admiralty to use money issued for
foreign secret service for domestic purposes, an acquittance
would be granted if they swore the following oath [22 Geo. III, c.
82, Section XXVII] before the Barons of the Exchequer:
I A.B. do swear, That the Money paid to me for Foreign
Secret Service, or for Secret Service in detecting, preventing, or defeating, treasonable, or other dangerous
Conspiracies against the State…, has been bona fide, applied to the said Purpose or Purposes, and to no other:
and that it hath not appeared to me convenient to the
State that the same should be paid Abroad. So help me
GOD.
In 1805, soon after the union of Britain and Ireland, a
similar provision was included in civil-list legislation for secretservice payments by Commissioners of the Lord High Treasurer
in Ireland to the Under Secretary for Civil Affairs in the Office
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FIGURE 1
General Account of the Monies issued and received
by the Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, late His Majesty’s
Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, under the
Head of Secret Service from 1st November 1809 to the 14
March 1810
Discharge

Charge
£
By Balance received
from the Right
Honourable George
Canning
By Exchequer Issues
during said period
To pay the fees thereon

£

397.19.4 Expended by William
Hamilton as per receipt

30,000.0.0 To Foreign Ministers
768.10.0 Deducted at the
Treasury and Exchequer
for Fees
Balance transferred
to M. Willerby as per
Receipt
£31,166.9.4

24,067.9.3

168.5.8
768.10.0

6162.4.5

£31,166.9.4

“The Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, this Accountant maketh oath that the
above Accounts to the best of his knowledge and belief are true and just” (25 June
1812).
Source: A.O. 3/949

of the Chief Secretary. To enhance parliamentary control over
secret-service payments for rebellious Ireland in “detecting, preventing or defeating treasonable or other dangerous Conspiracies against the State,” an acquittance was to be granted for the
Under Secretary who had been given the secret-service money
after making an oath very similar to that required of officials in
England. Unusually, and recognizing the fraught conditions in
Ireland, receipts or other documentation were not required, only
that the Under Secretary affirmed by oath before the Barons of
the Exchequer in Ireland that the money given to him had been
“bona fide applied to such Purposes” as approved and that the
spending of the money for these purposes had been approved
[45 Geo III, c. 76].
For the officials, most often an ambassador, who had paid
foreign agents, for which documentary evidence would have
been most unusual, a quietus would be given if within one year
of arriving back in England, they either returned any money
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received to the Exchequer or made the following oath [also see
A.O. 19/118] before the Barons of the Exchequer:
I A.B. do swear, That I have disbursed the Money, instructed to me for Foreign Secret Service, faithfully,
according to the Intent and Purpose for which it was
given, according to my best Judgment, for his Majesty’s
Service, So help me GOD.
No further documentation was required. The discharge was
given by the Treasury through the Upper Exchequer, or Exchequer of Accounts, which had the authority to summon before
it most officials who performed the role of public accountant;
that is, the individual held accountable by Parliament for money
spent by the executive. The Upper Exchequer also recorded the
details of the accounts of the public accountants. Once the quietus had been given by the Upper Exchequer, this was the final
authority. No matters could again be raised in relation to the
accounts and monies nor could they be challenged by the courts
[Binney, 1958, p. 189].
In most cases when no documentation was provided by
the sources of intelligence who ultimately received the secretservice monies, whether full-time spies or unofficial agents for
whom anonymity may have been a matter of life and death, the
oaths required of accountable officers associated with the secret
services assumed great importance. The oath in effect at times
substituted for the documentary evidence which was required
when accounting for other civil-list spending and mirrored
oath taking in the courts and elsewhere. The oath that accompanied the accounts fulfilled an important auxiliary role in the
accounting process by providing Parliament and the Treasury
with an additional assurance that the accounts were a “true
and just” rendition of how the secret-service money had been
used. The practice of taking an oath to attest to the veracity of
accounts and the fidelity of actions was very widespread, to be
found wherever an account of any significance was to be given.
Indeed, swearing an oath and relying upon the integrity of the
authorized officials was an essential accounting control. Thus,
inspectors of accounts working on behalf of the Board of Audit
also were required to take an oath [Commissioners for Auditing
the Public Accounts, 1786]:
...not to permit, suffer, or conceal, any fraud whatsoever
in any accounts intrusted to your care. In all Accounts...
you shall see that they are carefully and faithfully examined, drawn, and prepared for Auditing; giving therein
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to no Accountant any allowance but such as shall be
duly and regularly vouched and allowable according to
the custom, method, and rules of the Exchequer.
The influential Lord Shelburne in the late 18th century
was far less convinced of the efficacy of oaths as an accounting
control, preferring instead the rendering of accounts in a public
forum, with the one notable exception of secret-service accounts.
He observed [quoted in Binney, 1958, p.269] that he had:
...found by experience that this is the grand principle of
economy and the only method of preventing abuses; far
better than oaths or any other checks which have been
devised. Instead, therefore, of oaths there should be an
obligation to print at the end of the year every expenditure and every contract, except in cases of Secret Service, which may be subject to checks of another nature.
Unlike the present, an oath had far greater social significance in the 18th century. The right to take an oath was both a
mark of social position and provided a clear indication of the
legal status of the matter for which the oath was made. Also, as
much as the legal importance of the oath and its role as an administrative device, the ritual of taking an oath impressed upon
persons the importance of what they were about to do. Most
obviously taking an oath in court, in a form which has some
religious significance, when giving evidence has long been the
means by which courts are able to impress upon those involved
the importance of their actions and statements; indeed, their
very life might be in danger for a false declaration [Binney, 1958,
p. 269]. In the 18th century, a time when everyone was expected
to have a strong religious belief, the ritual of the taking an oath
was in effect a solemn appeal to God testifying to one’s truthfulness, which symbolized the expectation that any lies would not
escape unpunished for to swear a false oath was to imperil one’s
soul.
CONCLUSION
Given that the overriding concern of the civil-list reforms after 1782 was to protect the liberties of all Englishmen, any part
of government which was allowed to continue to operate with a
high level of secrecy and, thus, was a potentially potent means
to threaten liberty was especially important. Even though profound accounting and accountability changes were made to the
civil list after 1782, notably the appointment of commissioners
for auditing the public accounts, the treatment of secret-service
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spending in the Civil Establishments Act recognized that these
reforms had their limits when it came to clandestine operations
for which the giving of formal accounts for monies spent may
be incommensurate with the clandestine nature of the services
performed. The considerable opportunity that this allowed for
abuse in the spending of secret-service funds did not escape the
attention of Burke. Thus, the 1782 act contained a number of
significant clauses which were concerned with the amounts to
be spent on the secret services and, as a means to ensure that accountable individuals could be clearly identified, the procedure
by which the money would be spent and accounted for. The provisions of the act that were related to the secret services sought
to compensate for the unavoidable paucity of secret-service accounts by limiting the authority for secret-service spending to a
very few senior offices and relying upon their integrity.
The concerns of this article have been limited to a period
of time when the beginnings of modern systems of financial
accountability for governments were established and were beginning to be more fully appreciated. Thus, the article provides
the opportunity to prompt accounting historians to examine the
subsequent evolution from the early 19th century of accounting
for the secret services in Britain and other democratic states,
although recognizing the obvious significant impediments that
may be present to gaining access to information. These difficulties in and of themselves would prove the value of attempts to
investigate whether and how secret services have been made
accountable, but especially in the most chaotic and extreme
political circumstances such as war when there is a welldemonstrated tendency for governments to become dangerously
arrogant and the protections that mechanisms of financial accountability have provided for individual citizens are shown to
be insufficient. The surprising, ongoing silence in the literature
about the accountability of the secret services contradicts their
significance in times of war or other national military emergen
ces, such as the 21st century “war against terror” by the U.S. and
its allies, but especially the threat that abuses by insufficiently
accountable secret services can have for the liberty of citizens
in democratic states. The potency of this threat and the alacrity with which governments may be tempted to jeopardize the
liberty of individuals, either for reasons of political self-interest
or supposedly in the national interest, have been exposed many
times throughout the war-ravaged 20th century and now into
the 21st century. An enhanced understanding of accounting for
secret services would also complement the work by researchers
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such as Chwastiak [1999, 2001, 2006] and Gallhofer and Haslam
[1991], who have exposed the importance of accounting in justifying war, providing opportunities for the military industrial
complexes in states such as the U.S. and Britain to gain extravagant financial benefits from war and in excusing the excesses of
war.
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